Abstract-Real-time information flow security properties such as timed noninterference provide assurances that some time dependent information flows may not become possible. However, with transitive noninterference formulation, it is difficult to deal with intransitive flow policies like channel control and secure downgrading of information with time constraints. In this paper, we introduce the notion of trust domain into Timed Secure Process Algebra (tSPA), extending intransitive noninterference to real-time systems. Based on weak timed bisimulation equivalence, some security properties for intransitive flow are reformulated in a realtime setting, in particular one property which is persistent, meaning that if a system is secure then all of its reachable states are secure too. Furthermore, we prove that such persistent intransitive timed property is compositional, which is thus possible to alleviate the state space explosion problem caused by the interleaving of all the possible executions of parallel processes. Finally, we provide one case study showing that it is possible to model and analyze the real-time system through our approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information flow analysis is an important approach for studying computer systems security problem, and many security properties such as noninterference [1] have been proposed in the literature to capture the intuition of information flow. The aim of noninterference is to prevent any possible flow from the confidential level to the public one. However, the notion of noninterference is based on transitive flow policies. Hence, noninterference cannot deal with intransitive flow policies which are necessary in order to capture common concepts like channel control, or secure downgrading [2, 4] . A typical example for such concepts is that a high confidential domain should not directly communicate with a public network unless the confidential data of the high confidential domain has been properly encrypted by an encryption algorithm, which guarantees that the low level users cannot get the information from the encrypted data.
As a matter of fact, intransitive security policies can be well represented by the notion of intransitive noninterference, which avoid the interference of information flow with regard to the various secure domains of the system. Flow relations among these domains are not transitive. The common intuition behind such policies is that information can be transmitted from the high domain to the low domain through a trusted domain, but not directly from high one to low one.
Though the first really treatment of intransitive noninterference flow is given by Haigh and Young [3] , the better satisfactory formal definition on the same subject has been proposed by Rushby [4] , followed by Pinsky [5] and Roscoe [6] . For nondeterministic systems, Mantel [2] presents a novel notion based on event system for intransitive flow. In [7] , Bossi proposes a general framework for formalizing different noninterference properties in terms of process algebras. Recently, some researchers (e.g., [8, [17] [18] [19] ) have focused on mapping intransitive noninterference to a language-based setting. However, the approaches mentioned above are restricted to deterministic systems [4] [5] [6] [17] [18] [19] or nondeterministic systems [2, 7, 8] . In fact, most of these properties proposed there are based on analysis of information flow that does not take into consideration aspects of time or probability, and therefore they are not useful to analyze the existence of probabilistic or timing covert channels. To overcome this, some significant work has been done in order to extend the study by considering either time (see, e.g., [11, [20] [21] ) or probability (see, e.g., [9] [10] [14] [15] ).
In this paper we utilize the Timed Secure Process Algebra (tSPA, for short) language [11] , which is a timed extension of Secure Process Algebra (SPA, for short) [12] , to model real-time systems. Process algebras [13] provide well-developed theory tool to handle the interactions between a system and its users. Therefore the use of process algebras to analyze information flow security properties has received increased attention in recent years [7] . In [11] , Focardi uses tSPA to define several security properties for the analysis of timed noninterference. In this article we also chose the processalgebra as our analysis tool.
The main contribution of this paper is that we introduce the notion of trusted domain into tSPA and extend the intransitive noninterference theory in a realtime setting. In this paper, our discussion on intransitive noninterference security properties is based on weak timed bisimulation equivalence that provides a more suitable notion of observation to real system. Moreover, we propose one intransitive security property which is persistent, in the sense that if a system is secure then all of its reachable states are secure too. The strongest security property, called Intransitive Timed Strong Bisimulation Strong Nondeterministic Noninterference (I_tSBSNNI) is powerful to cope with information leakage from real-time system, e.g., timing covert channels.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we recall the tSPA language and the notion of weak timed bisimulation over tSPA terms. In section , the concept of trusted domain is introduced into tSPA, which is used as the tool for analyzing several intransitive noninterference properties of real-time systems. Section illustrates a case study in a time setting. Finally, Section discusses related work and Section gives a conclusion.
II. BASIC NOTIONS
In this section we review the syntax and semantics of the tSPA language and the definition of timed weak bisimulation [11] .
In [11] Let be the set of all reachable states from E, i.e., the set of processes that can be reached through the transition relations.
Here we elaborate two features of tSPA. The first one is time determinacy which ensures that the time elapsing never leads a process to two different states (i.e., tickdeterministic); another one is the so-called maximal progress assumption, guaranteeing that internal actions have high priority over the elapsing of time. The proof of the following lemma can be easily given by examining the operational rules as shown in Fig.1 ( ) E Der E , we have E is directly weakly time alive. In this paper, the behavioral equivalences we utilize is the timed version of weak bisimulation, which is described in [9] and formally stated as follows.
Definition 2 An equivalence relation R is a timed weak bisimulation if and only if, whenever, then for all ( 
A. Extending the tSPA Language
The universal notion of intransitive noninterference is that information can be transmitted from the high level to the low level via a trusted domain, but not directly from high to low. To extend intransitive noninterference to real-time system, the concept of trusted domain need to be introduced into the tSPA language, which can be performed just by extending tSPA with a set of trusted actions to simulate the behavior of trusted domain. Therefore, we partition the set of into the sets
Act and L Act , of high, trusted and low level action types. In this paper, our discussion is based on the assumption that the trusted part of the system is so strong that attackers cannot simulate the trusted actions. For example, a trusted computing PC provides enough secure protection to store the encryption keys via the Trusted Platform Module (TPM for short), and the attacker cannot get these keys. So it is reasonable to assume that attackers cannot simulate the trusted actions which are in T Act . Meanwhile, we assume that the trusted actions cannot be observed by the low level users.
B. Timed Intransitive Noninterference
For real-time systems, the general intuition behind all information flow properties is strictly related to the basic notion of timed noninterference, which says that a system is secure if what the low level users can observe does not rely on what the high level actions can be done. A formalization of such a property in the context of the tSPA language is expressed by Timed Bisimulation Strong Nondeterministic Noninterference (tBSNNI) [11] . We define the timed intransitive noninterference property by extending tBSNNI with trusted actions. Our property allows the low level users to deduce information about high level users' activity through trusted actions. 
C. Non Deducibility on Compositions
In this section, we present a timed security property stronger than I_tBSNNI. We first recall the Timed Bisimulation-based Non Deducibility on Compositions (tBNDC, for short) security property [11] , which is based on the idea of inspecting if the high users (here we simply refer to as the malicious attackers), modify the low-level response time of the system. Intuitively, a system E is tBNDC secure if what a low level user observes on the system must be invariable with respect to the composition with every high level process . Contrary to SPA, in the tSPA model, the process must be restricted to weakly time alive processes that can perform only action in { The I_tBSNNI property is not strong to detect potential deadlocks due to communications between a system and its high level users, and property I_tBNDC overcomes such shortcomings.
Example 2 Let us consider a process . It is provable that E is I_tBSNNI secure. Indeed, we have that
However, E is not I_tBNDC secure. It is sufficient to consider ( .0) l h . In this case the high level process executes the high-level action h , and the process E finds itself in the state (after the first is executed). Because of the hand-shake nature of tSPA communication, must wait for a corresponding external input which could never arrive and a deadlock is caused by the high process . It is straightforward to see that
The following theorem shows that I_tBNDC is at least as strong as I_tBSNNI. 
D. Persistent Security Properties
Due to the usage of the universal quantification, I_tBNDC is difficult to check. In this section, a persistent property stronger than I_tBNDC, namely I_tSBSNNI , is presented. The basic ideal is to require every state which is reachable by the system still satisfies the I_tBSNNI property. If this holds, we can prove that every possible reachable state is warranted to be secure. 
E. Compositionality of Security Properties
As described in [11] , the compositionality property is one of the most interesting features of tSBSNNI. In this section, the proposition below shows that the intransitive timed extension of this property also has this desirable feature.
Theorem 3 Whenever
I_ tSBSNNI, then also I_ tSBSNNI. 
. 
F Act Act , we have the same result that
. At last, we get
E F Act Act ; therefore, based on timed bisimulation, we have ((( ) \ ,
H T E F Act Act R . Fig. 2 reports the final diagram summarizing all the intransitive timed noninterference properties we have presented so far. In this section we will provide a case study showing that our approach can be employed to model and analyze security properties of real systems. Here, we consider a timed version of an example from [15] , in which a routing mechanism of the OSI network layer is modeled. An internetworking node(termed Interface Message Processor, IMP for short) is modeled by a process which decides on which output link an arriving packet should be sent, depending on the destination of that packet. There are two possible destinations, a and b, where a is occupied to transmit public data (the actions handing packets destined to a express the low-level observable behavior of the system), while b is utilized to transmit confidential data (the actions handing packets destined to b express the high-level observable behavior of the system).
In real application, Virtual Private Network (VPN for short) is usually used by companies or organizations to communicate confidentially over a public network. VPN is a private communications network founded at the network layer. In this section, we model the function of VPN, as well the definition for IMP [15] . Here, confidential packets (those destined to b) are properly encrypted first, and thus they are allowed to be transmitted over the low level channel destined to a. Fig.  3 shows the algebraic specification of our modified IMP.
Similarly, modified IMP is composed of the parallel composition of three components: term Arrivals modeling the incoming traffic, term Router modeling the core of the IMP, and term Channels modeling the outgoing channels. The behavior of each component of IMP is explained in [15] . The actions handling packets destined to a are low level actions, while the actions handling packets destined to b are high level actions. The trusted action encrypting represents the encryption phase. Therefore, we have that { , Intuitively, we observe that a low level packet destined to a received via term Arrivala which models a low level ingoing channel, handled by term Router which is the core of the IMP, and then sent on a low level outgoing channel. The standard noninterference property [15] requires that all the high-level components of the router cannot interference the execution of the actions handling such a low level packet. But in our modified IMP model, the high level component of the router (term Routing b ) can introduce trusted interactions between the low level and the high level. By enabling actions transma , transmb and encrypting in term , we can see that a high level packet can be either directly moved through the high level channel, or first encrypted by the trusted action encrypting and then delivered over the low level channel. Here, we refine the model by introducing construct, which is a timeout mechanism to resolve the deadlock problem. It is possible to prove that these potential high-level deadlocks may be used to construct time covert channels.
It is clear that a low level user may observe more packets sent over the low level outgoing channel than packets arrived at the low level ingoing channel, because some high level packets will be encrypted and then sent on the low level outgoing channel. The low level user cannot decrypt these encrypted packets. So our security properties permit such intransitive timed information flow from the high level to the low level through the trusted level. It can be formally verified that process IMP is I_tBNDC secure, but not I_tSBSNNI secure. In order to provide a formal foundation for the specification and analysis of security policies and models, the notion of noninterference has first been introduced by Goguen and Meseguer in [1] . While recognizing the inability of standard noninterference to model intransitive flow policies, they present several extensions to the basic formulation on the subject based on a unless construct in [16] . However, this construct does not deal with intransitive information flow, since it accepted some intuitively insecure systems as being secure. The first satisfactory formal definition of intransitive information flow is introduced by Rushby [4] . Using deterministic state machines as model tool, Pinsky [5] unifies the notions of transitive and intransitive noninterference based on purge functions. In [6] , Roscoe and Goldsmith provide an approach in terms of deterministic CSP to reveal some insecure flows which are not revealed by Rushby's approach. Besides above approaches for deterministic systems ([6] can deal with severely restricted nondeterminism), reference [2] proposes novel definitions to cope with intransitive flow which is suited for nondeterministic systems. In [7] researchers introduce a general unwinding framework for formalizing traditional and intransitive noninterference properties. Based on weak probabilistic bisimulation equivalence, Jiang [10] extends intransitive noninterference to rephrase some properties for probabilistic systems mentioned in [15] .
Related literature on real-time systems includes [11] , [20] and [21] . In [20] , an approach based on CSP, extended with a special event to denote the passage of time, is used for analyzing cryptographic protocols. The semantic model is rather similar (even if maximal progress is not assumed); we consider that, in the light of [22] , also the intransitive noninterference theory developed in this paper can be adapted to that setting. Similarly, the notion in [20] of using a real-time calculus for the analysis of time-dependent properties of cryptographic protocols can be adapted also to our setting. In [21] , the model of timed automata [22] is used as a basis for the analysis of information flow properties, based on trace semantics. The information flow properties studied there seem to be less limitative than tBNDC for they deal on the recognition of given patterns on the execution of high and low actions. The first generalization of noninterference to real-time systems was defined by Focardi and Gorrieri [11] . Their property is suited to capture time-dependent behaviors. However, it does not deal with the cases such as channel control, information flow filtering, or explicit downgrading. Our security properties (e.g., I_tBSNNI, I_tBNDC, I_tSBSNNI) can overcome this defect.
.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we concentrate on extending the intransitive noninterference theory to the discrete time case. Our main aim is to adopt a timed process algebra style in the definition of intransitive flow properties for real-time system. We first introduce the idea of trusted domain into Timed Secure Process Algebra and then may offer some time dependent information flows that can not be revealed by untimed noninterference. Our properties, namely I_tBSNNI, I_tBNDC and I_tSBSNNI, are all based on timed bisimulation equivalence used to distinguish between different process behaviors.
It is worthwhile noticing that the I_tSBSNNI security property is persistent, which requires that all of a process's derivatives satisfy the same security property. Moreover, one of the most inspiring features of I_tSBSNNI is that it is compositional. This is useful for alleviating the so-called state-explosion problem caused by the parallel executions of processes.
